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Tangredi: Antiaccess Warfare as Strategy

ANTIACCESS WARFARE AS STR ATEGY
From Campaign Analyses to Assessment of Extrinsic Events
Sam J. Tangredi

T

hinking about the concept of antiaccess warfare may be likened to thinking
about the Renaissance. Leonardo da Vinci, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Dante
Alighieri did not know that they were part of a renaissance; they simply experimented, strategized, and wrote in a fashion that seemed logical to them and appropriate to their times. It was the nineteenth-century European historian Jules
Michelet who “discovered” that “the Renaissance” had occurred.
Likewise, Themistocles, Elizabeth I, Isoroku Yamamoto, and Adolf Hitler (after early 1943) did not know that they were conducting antiaccess warfare. They
simply applied a strategy that was logical for a situation in which a strategically
superior power was attempting to penetrate—militarily, politically, or both—a
region they controlled. Originating circa 1991, the term antiaccess warfare is
simply the best appellation that has been developed to describe their strategies
for comparative purposes. As used throughout this
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the fact that presently the United States is a strategically superior global power
whose homeland lies outside the regions of potential crisis and conflict. As a
global power, it has allies, commercial ties, and deep interests in areas that are
thousands of miles from the continental United States, where most of its military
power is based. While the United States maintains a forward military presence in
many world regions, whether at sea or operating from bases in partner nations,
these deployed forces are necessarily limited, either by the physical hulls or by
diplomatic agreements. Forward-presence forces are intended to act as deterrents
to major war and as on-scene responders to more-limited crises—to prevent the
latter from becoming the former. If we are particularly alert, quick, or lucky, such
forces may prove sufficient by themselves to deal even with significant crises. But
they do not necessarily represent the full power required to prevail in a major
regional conflict. Hence, in most cases we would need to move decisive forces
from outside to inside the conflict region. Unlike most other nations, the United
States actually possesses the military logistics capabilities and control of the
global commons to do so.1
Antiaccess warfare is part of the strategy—used throughout history—of opposing such force movements (or the capacity, or the very decision, to move),
along with an effort to empty the region of forward-presence forces and reduce
the opponent’s overall regional influence. It is important for U.S. national security professionals to analyze and understand antiaccess warfare as an element of
peacetime as well as wartime strategy, if we are to counter it when required.
If the United States is to develop and maintain the capacity to defeat—and
thereby have the ability to deter—sophisticated antiaccess strategies that threaten
to reduce the U.S. presence in, influence over, or access to contested regions, a
coordinated, articulated, and persistent intragovernmental approach is required,
not just Department of Defense (DoD)–only planning. Logical first steps toward
creating such an interagency approach involve acknowledging and analyzing the
problem, examining its consequences, identifying mutually supportive actions,
and outlining processes by which an approach can be coordinated.2 This article
identifies the elements of antiaccess warfare strategies, outlines several historical
examples of success or failure, briefly suggests some of the means of countering
such strategies today, and describes ways to coordinate these means and evaluate
the assumptions and risks entailed.
TOWARD STRATEGIC-LEVEL ANALYSIS
To understand how to neutralize antiaccess strategies, we must analyze the
problem at the strategic level. In countering an antiaccess strategy, as opposed
to simply preparing or tailoring a military force package to defeat an antiaccess
military campaign, we must recognize that a viable antiaccess strategy—one
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/4
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designed to reduce U.S. influence and operational capabilities in a region of potential conflict—includes political, diplomatic, economic, legal, social, and media
actions, not just a military posture. This way of thinking goes beyond the military
campaign analysis often used to assess antiaccess warfare scenarios.3 Antiaccess
strategies involve all the phases of conflict, including preconflict “peace,” referred
to in planning documents as Phase 0. Some of these activities are captured by
current buzzwords, such as lawfare, soft power, cyber war, and gray-zone conflicts.
However, a comprehensive, multifaceted U.S. government strategy to actually
counter deliberate antiaccess efforts does not exist, nor has a comprehensive plan
appeared in the literature published by public research centers (think tanks) or
academic institutes that influence government policies.4
In other words, we know that potential opponents rely on the concept of antiaccess (no matter the term they use) as their primary approach to defeating, or
at least diminishing, U.S. regional influence backed by American military power.
But most of our government organizations either do not recognize the activities
involved or are not interested in analyzing and responding to them. Similarly,
most academic analysts have not examined these mutually supportive activities
as a broader unified strategy, rather than as individual issues or the elements of
active military campaigns.
Largely this is the result of antiaccess being perceived as but a military term
that applies solely within the province of DoD. The unfortunate, tactically oriented acronym A2/AD, which stands for antiaccess/area-denial, cements this perception.5 Indeed, the most authoritative official document discussing antiaccess
warfare, the Joint Staff J7–authored JOAC, briefly notes the comprehensiveness
of antiaccess strategies, but limits itself to developing a “warfighting concept”
to deal with such strategies militarily.6 It does not reject the pertinence of other,
nonmilitary activities, but simply does not regard them as falling within the
purview of the joint force. However, as noted previously, the problem is that
few outside DoD see these activities as falling within their purview either. The
JOAC notes that maintaining “operational access” to regions of interest is the
U.S. military’s contribution toward the “assured access” of the United States to
the global commons that is the prerequisite for economic access to these regions
themselves.7 However, there is no evidence that the wider U.S. government perceives the need for a strategy to ensure access, and access issues are mentioned
rarely, beyond cursory observations concerning the Navy’s role in maintaining
“freedom of the seas.”
One might argue that preparing to defeat antiaccess campaigns militarily is exactly the narrow focus on which DoD should concentrate. However, the problem
is that DoD does not control the totality of resources necessary to defeat an antiaccess strategy, and thus is at a severe disadvantage in planning or prosecuting a
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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counterantiaccess campaign. Such a campaign needs to include a wide range of
nonmilitary activities.
Moreover, with the end of the Cold War against Soviet expansionism, there
actually is less coordination of these activities within the U.S. government. During the Cold War there was often a tension between defense objectives and trade
policies (wheat sales to the Soviets provide one example), requiring higher-level
resolution.8 Today there is less tension, since there is little perception that such
activities are in any way related, except for occasional, often ineffective, economic
sanctions or embargoes of selected technologies or strategic materials imposed
on individual states.9 Admittedly, the need to counter terrorism following the
traumatic events of 9/11 did prompt mutual support among military operations,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement, but in a relatively narrow
band of activities (e.g., physical security) against a relatively unsophisticated
threat. Coordination of other transagency activities during the unending conflicts within Iraq (and Syria) cannot be rated as stellar.10
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTIACCESS WARFARE
To discuss a comprehensive antiaccess strategy, it is important to examine the
fundamental elements of antiaccess warfare itself. They are as follows:
1.	 The perception of the strategic superiority of an opponent
2.	 The primacy of geography, as the element that most influences time and
facilitates the combat attrition of the opponent’s forces
3.	 The general predominance of the maritime domain as conflict space
4.	 The criticality of information and intelligence, and concomitantly the
effects of strategic and operational deception
5.	 The determinative impact of extrinsic, sometimes apparently unrelated,
events in other regions or globally
The first element motivates a nation (or an armed group) to adopt antiaccess
as a primary defense strategy. The specification of defense strategy does not mean
that the nation or group has no offensive objectives, such as the seizure of another’s territory or the intimidation of neighbors; rather, it indicates that the primary aspect of the potential conflict is the involvement of an opponent of greater
military, political, diplomatic, or economic power, considered on a global scale.
This characterized the grand strategy of imperial Japan in the Second World
War. Competent Japanese leaders, such as Admiral Yamamoto, knew that the
United States was a strategically superior power by almost any measure. (Having
spent time in the United States, Yamamoto knew that firsthand.) However, Japan’s
leaders were committed to making conquests in the Asia-Pacific. This required
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/4
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driving U.S. military forces out of the region and ending U.S. political, diplomatic, economic, and social influence in the western Pacific. To protect their gains,
they needed to create an antiaccess barrier (fortified island chains and a powerful
navy) to ensure that the strategically superior but now regionally ousted United
States could not reenter the contested region. The United States thus needed to
penetrate that barrier.
All military planners recognize geography to be a critical operational factor
and seek to “manipulate the physical environment, exploit its strengths, evade its
weaknesses . . . and contrive always to make nature work for them.”11 If an antiaccess defender has greater accessibility to nearby regional geographic features,
it can facilitate attrition of its opponent through delay and constraint. Exploiting geography is the primary physical factor underlying an antiaccess strategy.
For example, without a barrier of islands (to complement the advantage of the
vast distances the United States faced) in the central and western Pacific, imperial Japan would have found it difficult to adopt an antiaccess posture (i.e., the
positioning of its forces) against a U.S. response to its conquests. Similarly, the
islands and straits that isolate the South China Sea and East China Sea from the
vast expanse (and maneuver space) of the Pacific allow China today to adopt an
antiaccess strategy against potential military responses and to counter U.S. political influence in the region. A Chinese antiaccess posture would be much less
effective without the vast distances of the Pacific, the relatively shorter distances
from China to its neighbors (the probable targets of any military action and the
definite targets of its expansion of influence), and the maritime geography that
would channel the U.S. fleet if it sought to enter the so-called first island chain.
The very use of the term first island chain by military planners implicitly acknowledges the geographic underpinning of China’s antiaccess strategy.
Given that wide oceans separate the United States from the areas of potential
regional conflict, it is an incontrovertible fact that the maritime domain (which
includes the air and space above it) would be the predominant conflict space in
any contingency involving the United States opposing a major enemy employing
an antiaccess strategy. Quibbles concerning that verity are largely parochial.
The criticality of information and intelligence in the cyber age is acknowledged
by everyone. However, when discussing them in terms of antiaccess warfare, the
focus is primarily on operational and tactical deception; yet what has succeeded
best in antiaccess campaigns has been strategic deception. Whereas operational
and tactical deception is directed at an opponent’s military operations, strategic
deception is directed at decision making on the national command authority
level, and is linked to the manipulation of extrinsic events, defined as events that
occur outside the contested region or do not involve military force, yet have a significant impact on the strategically superior power’s decision making. According
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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to an influential source, strategic deceptions “involve large numbers of individuals and organizations as perpetrators and victims of deception, including the national command authorities on both sides of the deception interaction; second,
. . . they are relatively long-term deceptions . . . and third, . . . their stakes are very
high, in that they can affect the outcomes of wars.”12
In contrast to all the above, the determinative impact of extrinsic, sometimes
unrelated events on the efforts and attention of the strategically superior power
is generally the element least acknowledged by those who conduct campaign- or
tactical-level analyses of antiaccess warfare, yet it is the most important. The
current “win-hold” construct—building an American joint force that can defeat an opponent in one region while holding off another in a different region
until forces can be “swung”—does appear to acknowledge that simultaneous
conflicts can occur. However, what is grasped only rarely is that events that are
not conflicts, or have not yet become conflicts—events that may occur in other
regions, are merely prevalent on a global basis, or are confined to nonmilitary
dimensions—nonetheless can have a profound impact on any “win.”
Research indicates that most nations (or armed groups) adopting an antiaccess
approach never actually defeat their strategically superior opponents in combat.13
What has occurred historically is that the strategically superior power just quits
fighting, because the costs appear too high when an event or other concerns of
even greater interest occur elsewhere.
For example, the ancient Greeks, led by Themistocles, were able to cut the sea
lines of communication that had allowed Xerxes to feed his vast Persian force in
Greece during the conflict of 480–479 bce. However, what actually caused Xerxes
to cease his efforts at conquest was his perception that revolts were brewing in
his empire, so his repressive hand was needed elsewhere. Of course, the Greeks
played a role in fanning those revolts.14
Similar actions have been a hallmark of antiaccess strategies throughout history. In preventing and defeating the Spanish armadas (note the plural), England’s Queen Elizabeth I used multiple methods to incite extrinsic events. She
financed the prolonged war of independence that the Dutch United Provinces
fought against Spain. She let loose the English pirates of the Caribbean (in her
eyes, unofficial privateers or high-risk “adventurers”) against Spanish colonies.
She employed spies and agents, and even feigned contemplation of marriage to
forestall a Franco-Spanish alliance against England. All this was done in a time of
ostensible peace.15 Over a period of more than two decades, such activities effectively bankrupted Spain, ensuring that Philip II never could concentrate enough
force to plow through the Royal Navy and land on English shores, an event that
would have pitted battle-hardened Spanish troops against local English levies. By
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the time the first Spanish armada reached the English Channel, Spain’s strategic
power already had been reduced.
In the example of imperial Japan, its improbable 1940 alliance with Nazi
Germany (and tacit nonaggression agreement with the Soviet Union) can be
understood only as an effort to help ensure that a war in Europe would draw in
the United States. Generating this extrinsic event was intended to divert U.S. attention and forces away from the western Pacific.
With this in mind, a strategist might be prompted to ask: In the event of a
pending conflict, what would China do today, or in the future? Is a potential war
in the South China Sea over reefs claimed by Vietnam or the Philippines of moreprofound interest to U.S. decision makers than Russian pressure on the Baltic
nations, all of which are members of NATO? These questions—often stated but
only lightly examined—must be analyzed in detail, because they, not a weapons
count, will determine the outcome of an antiaccess conflict. Again, historical
analysis indicates that antiaccess forces rarely have defeated the strategically superior power on the battlefield (witness the Korean and Vietnam Wars). In many
cases, the dominant actor seemed on course for a military victory; it was other
considerations that caused that superior power to change course. In the case of
the Greek-Persian conflict, it should be recalled that Athens—one of Xerxes’s
major targets—already had been abandoned and burned to the ground before the
Athenian Themistocles was able to orchestrate the battle of Salamis.16
The sorts of questions posed above, generated by the fact that extrinsic events
historically have played the greatest role in successful antiaccess strategies, should
prompt analysts both in government and in think tanks to make a more detailed
examination of the phenomenon on the strategic level. Mostly, however, we just
continue to argue about A2/AD.
THE UNFORTUNATE ACRONYM
The discourse on antiaccess warfare has been dominated by the acronym A2/
AD, standing for antiaccess/area-denial. Credit for the term largely belongs to the
highly influential defense issues think tank the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). However, since its origination the term A2/AD has
been used more often as an adjective to describe the types of weapons systems
and networks expected to be used in an antiaccess campaign, rather than to refer
to the underlying strategy.17 The tortuous origin of the A2/AD acronym—which
has been in use for over fifteen years—has been covered elsewhere, and that
discussion will not be repeated here.18 What should be noted is that use of the
acronym, and the full term antiaccess/area-denial, has driven much of the discussion of antiaccess away from strategy and almost exclusively toward tactics and
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force structures. The construct seems perfectly tailored to campaign analysis.
This is not to say that discussion of tactics and force structures is not important,
only that discussion of how to deter or defeat the underlying strategy is equally
important, if not more so.
There has been some pushback, albeit rare, on the use of the A2/AD acronym.
In October 2016, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John Richardson,
USN, authored an article on the National Interest’s website that sought to “deconstruct,” and thereby discourage, use of the A2/AD term. In the CNO’s view,
“A2AD is a term bandied about freely, with no precise definition, that sends a
variety of vague or conflicting signals, depending on the context in which it is
either transmitted or received.” More importantly, from his perspective, the “area
denial” half of A2/AD symbolizes a “mindset” in which the U.S. Navy automatically would be forced to operate outside the “red arcs” that mark the theoretical
range of the kinetic weapons of the potential opponent, thereby discounting
the Navy’s ability to operate within that range—particularly using its superior
undersea warfare forces—from the outset of any conflict. As he puts it, “Often,
I get into A2AD discussions accompanied by maps with red arcs extending off
the coastlines of countries like China or Iran. The images imply that any military
force that enters the red area faces certain defeat—it’s a ‘no-go’ zone! But the reality is much more complex. . . . Those arcs represent danger, to be sure . . . but the
threats are not insurmountable.” He concludes, “If we fixate on A2AD, we are not
looking far enough forward.”19
In his article, the CNO does not go on to capture the complexity of antiaccess
strategies from the broader perspective, as that was not his intent. But his point
about not “looking far enough forward” also can be applied to critiquing the lack
of a broad approach to the broader perspective. The combination term A2/AD
prompts a focus on weapons system performance in operational situations (e.g.,
Chinese DF-21 missiles vs. USN aircraft carriers), making it easier for analysts
to neglect nonmilitary aspects and the role of deterrence. Indeed, the area-denial
portion of the A2/AD construct refers to what could be considered standard
tactics in force-on-force combat, and therefore contributes little to the broader
perspective.
AN EXAMPLE OF THE BROADER VIEW
To apply a broader strategic perspective to an apparent antiaccess disposition, let
us consider the South China Sea scenario that many defense analysts wargame
to assess the outlines of a potential conflict between the United States, particularly the U.S. Navy and Air Force, and China, particularly the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force, and the PLA Rocket Force (the
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latter controls both conventional warhead– and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles).
The chosen battleground is the vicinity of the Spratly islets that China has solidified and fortified.20
The South China Sea situation has been analyzed in extensive detail in classified and unclassified reports and war games, and academic studies abound,
so only a sketch will be included here. It would be most logical for the scenario
to incorporate Chinese adoption of an antiaccess strategy. By all open-source
measures, the U.S. Navy appears superior to the PLAN. Combined with U.S. Air
Force assets, the U.S. Navy potentially could establish sea control in the South
China Sea if it faced the PLAN alone. (It is China’s potential use of land-based
Rocket Force missiles that makes an antiaccess approach viable.) The current
capabilities of USN attack submarines would make it difficult for major PLAN
vessels to sortie without considerable risk. China is working steadily to improve
PLAN capabilities, particularly in naval aviation (aircraft carrier based) and
antisubmarine warfare; but, as a point of comparison, the U.S. Navy can deploy
in force and threaten Guangzhou, whereas the PLAN cannot deploy out of area
and threaten Pearl Harbor. Clearly, the United States is strategically superior in
terms of conventional force on a global basis. (Since this is a maritime scenario, a
contest between U.S. land forces and the PLA is presumed not to occur.)
As would any antiaccess force facing an out-of-area, strategically superior
power, China would attempt to take advantage of the geographic conditions to
employ asymmetric means to prevent the American fleet from entering the South
China Sea. Most planners agree that the primary asymmetric means would be the
antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) (e.g., DF-21Ds) or land-attack intermediaterange ballistic missiles (IRBMs) (e.g., DF-26s) controlled by the PLA Rocket
Force. These are definitely asymmetric capabilities, since the U.S. joint force does
not possess such weapons (primarily because of the U.S.-Soviet IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty of 1988, which eliminated all land-based U.S.
IRBMs).21 In the event of conflict, U.S. analysts expect China to use ASBMs and
IRBMs in addition to ship- and land-based cruise missiles against American ships
and allied naval ports, along with cyber- and other electronic–warfare attacks.
But in the broader perspective, would China really have to rely on military
means to achieve the goal of neutralizing a U.S. response? Antiaccess strategies
include nonmilitary means, along with every other possible leverage that the
antiaccess nation (or armed group) possesses, to make entering the region very
costly to the out-of-area, strategically superior power. An important factor not
usually discussed is that the DF-21 (and probably the DF-26) was designed to
carry a nuclear warhead, and it is difficult to determine which missile is conventionally armed and which is nuclear armed. An early means of achieving an
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asymmetric effect could consist of political-military-diplomatic signaling and be
informational: China might declare that it will not rule out using tactical nuclear
weapons to defend its sovereignty claims over the Spratlys and the South China
Sea. Since the U.S. homeland would not be threatened, such use logically would
not trigger an intercontinental nuclear response. Perhaps such a statement would
constitute strategic deception—the Chinese Politburo might be very reluctant to
spark (or reenergize) what otherwise inevitably would become a nuclear arms
race in East Asia.22 However, the threat is credible because the PLA has built
the means (antiaccess systems) to carry it out. The PLAN fleet would not even
have to sortie. In response, U.S. decision makers would face the difficult choice
among threatening a nuclear response—which could escalate into an intercontinental nuclear war; avoiding any confrontation of the Chinese claims; issuing an
ambiguous “all military options are on the table” statement; or simply ignoring
the threat.
The United States has many global interests besides those in the South China
Sea. Some would argue that it has no vital interests riding on who controls that
area. Because of the INF Treaty, the United States has no IRBMs with which to
threaten an analogous response and thereby deter the PLA. Would the U.S. president hazard a tactical nuclear attack on U.S. and allied forces over the Spratlys?
Would DoD feel confident that it could determine which DF-21 is nuclear armed
and which is not, such that it could determine the validity of the threat? Would
it feel confident that it could blind the PLA strike-reconnaissance network sufficiently to make the threat ineffective? How would U.S. allies and partners react
to the potential for tactical nuclear use in East Asia?
Going a step further, consider the integration of the Chinese economy into the
West and Western manufacturing supply chains. What if China declares that it
will end the export of rare earth elements (minerals) if its sovereignty claims are
challenged in the South China Sea?23 This would increase manufacturing costs
in the near term, and eventually would affect high-tech industries worldwide.
For that matter, what if China threatened to withdraw its global investments?
A “coalition of the willing”—those countries that would be willing to challenge
Chinese sovereignty claims in the Spratlys—might prove to be pretty thin.
In effect, such actions would generate extrinsic events in the global economy
that would increase the cost of a U.S. movement or a “return to the region.” Similar Chinese threats against Japanese or Korean sovereignty likely would have no
effects whatsoever on the current strong U.S. commitments to defend Japan and
Korea—except possibly strengthening them. But our nontreaty partnerships with
other countries involve no formal U.S. commitments.
Using nonkinetic means, the antiaccess force potentially can check the strategically superior power. That is what antiaccess strategies are all about.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/4
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GENERATING CONSIDERATION OF EXTRINSIC EVENTS
The point of examining the South China Sea scenario from a broader perspective is not to give Chinese military planners new ideas; undoubtedly they are not
new to them. The point is to identify considerations that the U.S. government
must examine as a whole. For example, a Chinese tactical nuclear threat might
be neutralized by negotiating an Asian INF arms control treaty. Conversely, an
analogous deterrent effect might be achieved if the United States reinterpreted
the existing INF Treaty as allowing the deployment of IRBMs in the Pacific region. That is not to suggest that doing either of these things is possible, or even
wise policy. Rather, it is to suggest that these are actions that the U.S. Department
of State (DOS) should be examining if the U.S. government—not just DoD—were
to recognize antiaccess warfare as necessitating a whole-of-government strategy
(to employ a clichéd phrase), not as just a military operational problem. There are
ideas with which DOS needs to grapple if it is to be part of the effort to counter
or deter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) antiaccess calculus. (The PLA is
pledged to the Party, not the Chinese state; the matter of the CCP’s survival also
can have an impact on extrinsic events.)
The rest of the U.S. government needs to recognize the importance of extrinsic events (or the threat thereof). In the scenario of a temporary Chinese
stranglehold on rare earth elements—which would be extrinsic to the issue of
South China Sea sovereignty—it would fall to the Department of Commerce to
determine whether there is indeed a dependency, and therefore whether the U.S.
government should maintain a stockpile of such strategic materials to protect U.S.
industries in the event of a cutoff executed as an element of a Chinese antiaccess
strategy. Maintaining a stockpile is a deterrent to the threat or execution of such
an embargo to further Chinese objectives in East Asia. However, one profitably
might ask whether any planner in the Department of Commerce ever has heard
the term antiaccess.
One hopes that the Department of the Treasury is scrutinizing closely the
likely effects of a Chinese disinvestment from global markets (particularly the
securities market in the United States). But the South China Sea scenario is probably not a concern within the Treasury Department, so Treasury likely is not
considering such disinvestment as part of an antiaccess strategy that the United
States must prepare to counter. Have the department’s planners determined
whether, from a global perspective, the U.S. government could declare treasury
bills held by the CCP or Chinese citizens to be null and void—without completely
unraveling the rest of the bond market? The threat of these actions might provide
more deterrence against the PLAN than a military theater posture.24 Would other
investors lose faith in the security of U.S. treasury bonds, even if these extraordinary actions were necessitated within a context of armed conflict? What would
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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happen to global markets if the U.S. Navy were to interdict the transshipment of
oil from the Persian Gulf to China? The operational aspects of such a presidential
decision fall to the Navy, but the economic effects transcend DoD and need to be
examined by other departments and agencies.
A COORDINATED U.S. RESPONSE
Countering an antiaccess challenge—whether it emanates from the CCP, Iran,
ISIS, or other entities—requires a whole-of-government approach. If extrinsic
events ensure the success of antiaccess strategies, a mechanism must be created
to bring together the resources of non-DoD agencies to identify, analyze, plan
for, and take actions to deter or respond to the antiaccess strategies of particular
competitors.25 The problem is broader than a strictly military challenge, so the
solutions must emanate from something broader than military campaign analysis. These solutions, when combined, would enhance the deterrence from armed
conflict and the credibility of military options. DoD traditionally has had strong,
practical, working relationships with DOS and the Central Intelligence Agency,
but—as the examples above make clear—this is not enough.
It is never fair to argue for solutions without suggesting a process to generate them. There are at least three distinct methods or processes that the U.S.
government has used in the past to coordinate across departments and agencies,
or at least to determine how to coordinate. They are as follows: (1) creating an
executive committee; (2) drafting presidential-level strategic plans; and (3) appointing a bureaucratic “czar” or setting up a “coordinating center.” Each method
has its pros and cons, its assumptions and risks, and all should be considered.26
Of course, the last thing most government executives want to do is to staff yet
another committee or maintain an independent center.
A primary model of the executive committee approach is the National Security Council (NSC). The public often perceives the assistant to the president
for national security affairs (i.e., the national security advisor) and his or her
staff as constituting the NSC, but that is primarily bureaucratic and journalistic
shorthand.27 The council actually is chaired by the president and falls under the
Executive Office of the President. Its statutory members are the vice president,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy. Other cabinet
members (often the Attorney General) attend when requested (or when they
insist on being invited). As strategic analysts are well aware, the national security
advisor controls the process (the scheduling and content of meetings), thereby
wielding an influence over policy that sometimes exceeds that of cabinet members, depending on his or her relationship with the president. The national security advisor has a staff of at least twenty-five deputies and special assistants (most
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of whom focus on regional affairs), who attempt to tailor policy responses to the
council’s (or the national security advisor’s) interests.28
Creating a position of special assistant for countering antiaccess strategies
within the NSC staff would be one method of raising the awareness of top national security decision makers, including the president, regarding how comprehensive the antiaccess challenge is. This special assistant could coordinate a
government-wide strategic response. Of course, the assumption is that such a
special assistant would be able to raise the issue to the council via the national
security advisor. The risk of that assumption is that the number of issues and
topics facing the national security advisor is prodigious, and the need for a comprehensive strategy in this area might not be considered a priority. The personal
relationship between the special assistant and the national security advisor might
determine whether the issue rose to the council level.
An additional assumption is that, having been given direction by either the
council or the national security advisor, the special assistant would have the credibility and interpersonal skills necessary to coordinate responses from agencies
that might be disinterested or recalcitrant.29 The NSC staff itself has no authority
over the policies of the agencies except that which the relationship between the
national security advisor and the president implies. The cabinet-level council
members likely would inform their own staffs of decisions relating to a comprehensive strategy; but, again, the risk is that the strategy’s importance would get
lost amid the noise of other issues, leaving the special assistant with little influence over member priorities. Moreover, many departments and agencies are not
represented on the council, and incorporating them via invited attendance or
through the efforts of the special assistant likely would be difficult. However,
if the special assistant were successful in these tasks, he or she might become
effectively an antiaccess issues czar—converting this first option into the third
method of coordination.
At first glance, the second process—drafting and promulgating an executive,
presidential-level, public document for implementing a counterantiaccess strategy (which might be termed an access strategy)—would seem the most desirable
method by which to achieve government-wide coordination. The assumption
is that once the president states, “This is my policy,” members of the executive
branch would endeavor to incorporate it into their department or agency plans
and carry it out. The problem (and risk) is that it would get lost amid the myriad
of such policy pronouncements—most published in “slick and glossy” format—
on a variety of issues, many of which contain language designed for public
consumption that is too vague for actual policy implementation. Making government policy clear to the voting public is commendable; however, the reality is
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that, because such “strategies” primarily are a means of public communication,
they generally are limited in actionable direction and are read only rarely by decision makers in other agencies, each of which has its own strategic plan, or at least
its own policies and priorities.
Issuing a classified plan might allow the inclusion of actionable direction, approaching the specificity of a war plan, and perhaps that would be the appropriate
way to initiate interagency coordination and collaboration. However, two risks
or disadvantages need to be considered. First, classification inevitably results
in limiting the audience. Second, allowing access to classified material across
agency boundaries is difficult owing to conflicting or inconsistent classification
standards, particularly among agencies that do not have a history of close cooperation. Both risks can be mitigated, but they cannot be ignored.
The third method is the creation of a czar who has independent authority over
specific actions and can direct activities through a coordination center staffed by
individuals seconded from and empowered by their parent agencies. As it relates
to the federal government, czar is an informal term used, primarily by the media,
to refer to a senior official charged with developing and implementing a specific
policy rather than leading an agency. Examples include the head of the Office of
War Information during the Second World War and the director of the National
Cybersecurity Center, director of National Drug Control Policy, and director of
the Office of National AIDS Policy today. However, the effectiveness of the individuals appointed to these positions is always dependent on their personal relationships with the president and their ability to assuage the concerns of cabinet
members and agency directors as well as Congress.30 The risk of tasking a policy
czar with coordinating an overall approach to countering antiaccess strategies is
that he or she becomes bureaucratically ineffective if he or she does not remain
in the president’s direct view.
So, which of the three methods would be appropriate for coordinating an
intragovernmental response to competitors’ antiaccess strategies? The most
honest answer—“It depends”—is hardly satisfying. However, application of the
principle that, when dealing with uncertainty, the simplest solution is the place
to start means that appointment of an NSC staff special assistant for countering
antiaccess strategies would be the logical initial—inevitably experimental—step.
It appears the least costly option, in that it builds on an existing process, with a
specific individual responsible for success or failure. That individual would be
responsible for managing the drafting of an actionable U.S. counterantiaccess
plan—here’s where access strategy might be a better term—by subject-matter
experts from all agencies involved.31 Once such an access strategy was approved
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via the NSC process, the same special assistant would be tasked with achieving
interagency implementation. The risks can be mitigated only by appointing a
particularly skilled and determined individual, and those risks might reemerge
when that particular individual departed.
PURVIEW OF AN ACCESS STRATEGY
It is important to note that a government-wide access strategy should not duplicate the campaign analysis that DoD conducts. Responsibility for planning to
conduct combat operations against an opponent’s antiaccess posture or campaign
belongs to DoD, and the department has expended great effort to examine the
problem from a war-fighting perspective. In Admiral Richardson’s article, the
CNO comments that “the A2AD problem is currently well understood—challenging, but understood.” On the operational level, he is right. There is plenty of
room for debate concerning the means and force structure required to “break the
great walls,” but that debate is ongoing.
The government-wide access strategy should focus on assessing extrinsic
events—that is what is lacking. We need a plan—one that goes beyond the purely
military—to routinely identify, analyze, deter, and, if necessary, respond to elements of an antiaccess strategy. National security agencies certainly examine
many of the nonmilitary aspects of antiaccess, such as governments deploying
fishermen as maritime militia, exerting economic pressures on neighboring
states, and fomenting ethnic disturbances in “near abroads.” However, these
nonmilitary aspects currently are considered as isolated phenomena or merely
regional events. China experts examine the use of the maritime militia. Russia
experts examine naval basing in Syria. Such steps are examined in terms of their
effects on sovereignty claims in the South China Sea or the military balance in
the Mediterranean; they are not examined as tactics in support of strategies to
reduce the influence and presence of the United States and other Western nations
as a prelude to denying U.S. access to the region through military means. They
are not seen as coordinated components. Moreover, the questions of how to deter
such actions and how to respond with nonmilitary means currently are examined
in isolation or not at all.
Use of the term grand strategy often provokes definitional debates. If it is
defined as a strategy based on all vital interests of a nation-state (or some other,
nongovernmental global actor), then antiaccess strategies are only a part of grand
strategy. Yet the perspective required to understand antiaccess must be grand,
the instruments of deterrence and response must be grand, and countering antiaccess strategies must be a grand effort.
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What are the assumptions and risks involved in creating a government-wide
access strategy?
Obviously, the entering assumption is that the very concept of antiaccess is
real or practical and not simply an academic construct. Thus far, experts have
not challenged its validity, but perhaps that is only because it is perceived as a
DoD-only issue. A vigorous debate would be useful. Some analysts may doubt
that potential opponents can implement and coordinate antiaccess strategies, because of their complexity. However, antiaccess strategies leading to war primarily
have been the tools of authoritarian regimes (such as imperial Japan and juntacontrolled Argentina), which have the means to coordinate nongovernmental as
well as governmental resources.32
The risks might include the NSC fixating on the antiaccess concept, so that
it sees conspiracies at every hand. However, the likely military and geopolitical
opponents of the United States and its allies and partners are pretty easy to identify. If assessing their actions in terms of the antiaccess concept and examining
nonmilitary means of responding lead to enhanced deterrence, a coordinated
access strategy has done its job. From the perspective of DoD, any nonmilitary
means of response serve to fortify its military planning. A strategic plan need not
be implemented to be useful; it is useful if it identifies options that the president
had not examined previously. The primary risk, therefore, is that the time and
effort of the planners involved will be wasted if decision makers ultimately reject
the concept and plan. Of course, that occurs every single day in the world of
strategic planning.
OPERATIONALLY READY, BUT STRATEGICALLY UNPREPARED
Regarding the CNO’s remarks, DoD indeed has examined the antiaccess concept
from a war-fighting perspective. The studies and reports are numerous, and
presumably the key insights have been integrated into the operational planning
of the combatant commanders. The naval services, like the other services, have
attempted to grapple with the A2/AD environment in developing their force
structures. DoD officials of the Obama administration certainly were attuned
to the military aspects of the antiaccess challenge. Indeed, prior to his return to
government service, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work authored significant reports related to A2/AD.33 The air-sea battle approach to syncing Navy
and Air Force efforts in a potential counterantiaccess campaign eventually was
sunk, but that was because it hit the rocks of joint ideology, diplomatic concerns,
and academic alarmism, not because the existence of the threat was rejected.34
It is easy to argue that the U.S. Navy, along with other services, has not made
the correct investments to deal with antiaccess campaigns, but making forcestructure changes to a current fleet whose life span exceeds thirty years is not
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easy.35 There are many gaps in our capabilities to break the great walls.36 Yet it
would seem that the CNO’s perception that—within DoD—the A2/AD problem
is “currently well understood” is true.
But while that may be true on the operational level, the strategic antiaccess
challenge will not be understood well unless we examine it as a whole. We need
to move beyond DoD campaign analysis to assessing the extrinsic events that can
constitute the nonmilitary elements that comprise such campaigns. We do not
need the genius of a Leonardo, Machiavelli, or Dante to do that. What we need
is a process that brings together the minds of all the practitioners, develops an
intragovernmental strategic plan, and assigns responsibility to an individual to
ensure coordination and execution. Would integrating the planning of DoD and
the other relevant agencies perhaps produce a “strategic renaissance”?
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